2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
bircniandLunny Xiao 444879b492 update to 28.1.0 (#578)
Bump the v28 docs to the 28.1.0 release, following the 1.27.3 bump (#532):

- point the `28` version variables (`version`, `sourceVersion`, `dockerVersion`, `displayVersion`) at 28.1.0
- update the v28 entry in `update_api_docs.sh` to `28.1.0`
- regenerate `static/swagger-28.json` and `static/openapi3-28.json` from the `v28.1.0` tag

---------

Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-on: https://gitea.com/gitea/docs/pulls/578
Reviewed-by: TheFox0x7 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: bircni <[email protected]>
2026-10-07 03:00:58 +00:00
bc7e2b3caa docs: link-local egress targets are allowable (#573)
Documents https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39560: link-local addresses can be allowed with an explicit `ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` entry again, only cloud metadata endpoints stay hard-denied. Merge after that PR.

*Written by Claude.*

---------

Co-authored-by: bircni <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <[email protected]>
Reviewed-on: https://gitea.com/gitea/docs/pulls/573
Reviewed-by: bircni <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <[email protected]>
2026-10-06 21:56:56 +00:00
5 changed files with 12 additions and 11 deletions

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+5 -4
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@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ And the following unique queues:
- `DISABLE_QUERY_AUTH_TOKEN`: **false**: Reject API tokens sent in URL query string (Accept Header-based API tokens only). This setting will default to `true` in Gitea 1.23 and be deprecated in Gitea 1.24.
- `TWO_FACTOR_AUTH`: **_empty_**: set to enforced to enforce two factor authentication. Only available in Gitea 1.24 and later.
- `EGRESS_MODE`: **lax**: Egress mode toggles between strictness of outgoing requests:
- `lax` requires addresses to be allowed only if they are in private ranges, it allows all public ones
- `lax` non-public targets (private, loopback, link-local, CGNAT and special-use ranges) to be allowed, it allows all public ones
- `strict` requires an explicit allow of all addresses
- `ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`: **_empty_**: Webhook and oauth2 clients can only call allowed hosts for security reasons. Comma separated list, eg: `192.168.1.0/24:3000`, `[2001:db8::/32]:9090`, `*.mydomain.com:[80|443]`
- Built-in networks:
@@ -660,8 +660,9 @@ And the following unique queues:
- a bracketed set of ports and ranges, `|` separated: `*.mydomain.com:[80|443|3000-3010]`
- all ports: `*.mydomain.com:*`
- A portless entry covers all ports in `lax` mode, only 80 and 443 in `strict` mode
- Port specs apply only where the list is consulted: in `lax` mode that is private, loopback and CGNAT targets alone, public targets are allowed on every port whatever the list says. In `strict` mode every target is checked, so ports restrict public hosts too.
- Reserved addresses like link-local and cloud metadata are denied
- Port specs apply only where the list is consulted: in `lax` mode that is non-public targets alone, public targets are allowed on every port whatever the list says. In `strict` mode every target is checked, so ports restrict public hosts too.
- Non-public targets need an IP or built-in entry, a host name entry alone never covers them.
- Reserved addresses (the IPv4-embedding NAT64, Teredo and 6to4 ranges, this-network, multicast and broadcast) are denied whatever the list says. To reach them configure an HTTP proxy
- This list is enforced on direct connections only. When an HTTP proxy is configured, restricting the proxied target is the proxy server's responsibility.
## Audit (`audit`)
@@ -1439,7 +1440,7 @@ in this mapping or the filetype using heuristics.
- `MAX_ATTEMPTS`: **3**: Max attempts per http/https request on migrations.
- `RETRY_BACKOFF`: **3**: Backoff time per http/https request retry (seconds)
- `EGRESS_MODE`: **lax**: Mode toggles between strictness of scanning outgoing requests, same format as `EGRESS_MODE` in [`security`](#security-security).
- `ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`: **_empty_**: Hosts migrations and mirrors may call, same format as `ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` in [`security`](#security-security). Private and loopback addresses need a builtin or CIDR entry. When unset, the deprecated `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` entries apply on every port with `strict` as the default mode, and the deprecated `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS` adds `private, loopback`.
- `ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`: **_empty_**: Hosts migrations and mirrors may call, same format as `ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` in [`security`](#security-security). Private, loopback and link-local addresses need a builtin or CIDR entry. When unset, the deprecated `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` entries apply on every port with `strict` as the default mode, and the deprecated `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS` adds `private, loopback`.
- `BLOCKED_HOST_LIST`: **_empty_**: Hosts migrations and mirrors may never call, portless entries cover all ports.
- `SKIP_TLS_VERIFY`: **false**: Allow skip tls verify
+4 -4
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@@ -89,11 +89,11 @@ const variables: Record<string, VersionVariables> = {
goVersion: '1.27',
minGoVersion: '1.27',
minNodeVersion: '22',
version: '28.0.0',
sourceVersion: 'v28.0.0',
version: '28.1.0',
sourceVersion: 'v28.1.0',
sourceBranch: 'release/v28',
dockerVersion: '28.0.0',
displayVersion: '28.0.0',
dockerVersion: '28.1.0',
displayVersion: '28.1.0',
},
'1.27': {
goVersion: '1.26',
+1 -1
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@@ -11119,7 +11119,7 @@
"url": "http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT"
},
"title": "Gitea API",
"version": "28.0.0"
"version": "28.1.0"
},
"openapi": "3.0.3",
"paths": {
+1 -1
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@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
"name": "MIT",
"url": "http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT"
},
"version": "28.0.0"
"version": "28.1.0"
},
"basePath": "https://gitea.com/api/v1",
"paths": {
+1 -1
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@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ if [ "$LATEST_ONLY" -eq 1 ]; then
exit 0
fi
for ver in '28.0.0' '1.27.3' '1.26.4' '1.25.5' '1.24.7' '1.23.8' '1.22.6'; do
for ver in '28.1.0' '1.27.3' '1.26.4' '1.25.5' '1.24.7' '1.23.8' '1.22.6'; do
# 1.x releases are suffixed with the minor (1.27.3 -> 27), the versions
# without the 1. prefix with the major (28.0.0 -> 28)
case "$ver" in